Commodity trading strategies in the presence of multiple exchanges and liquidity constraints. by Li, Xu. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management.
Commodity Trading 
Strategies in the Presence of 
Multiple Exchanges and 
Liquidity Constraints 
LI, Xu 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
In 
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management 
© The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
December 2008 
The University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. 
Any person(s) intending to use a part or whole of the materials in 
the thesis in a proposed publication must seek copyright release 
from the Dean of the Graduate School. 
It i l jN 20Wj| 
W n ^ s r a r y s y s t e m 乂谬 
Thesis/Assessment Committee 
Professor CHEN, Youhua (Chair) 
Professor FENG, Youyi (Thesis Supervisor) 
Professor ZHOU, Xiang (Committee Member) 
Professor CHEN, Shaoxiang (External Examier) 
Abstract 
The companies that consume commodities such as natural gas, crude oil 
and their products bear large risk exposure on the volatile price moves of 
these commodities. This is a main motivator of exploring this decision 
making problem for an inventory system which can both replenish and 
sell stock in multiple spot exchanges. Different from previous research in 
literature, this paper takes price-varying effect into account and 
characterizes the structure of optimal trade policies as market-dependent 
multi-level 0，. S; H) policies. It extends the work of [16] to the extent in 
which multiple suppliers are available simultaneously, and also [22] and 
[3] to the extent in which multiple discount opportunities coexist and vary 
over time. Thus, this work enriches the literature of generalized inventory 
ordering policies and lends itself to the energy industries, for instance, to 
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Nowadays the companies that consume commodities such as natural 
gas, crude oil and their products bear large risk exposure due to the 
volatile prices moves of these commodities. It was reported in the news 
in [7] on June 7, 2008 that 
“After hitting its previous peak of $133.17 a barrel last month, oil tum-
bled $8.2 in nine days... (Yesterday) U.S. benchmark crude settled up 
by a record-setting $10.75 to close at $138.54 on the New York Mer-
cantile Exchange.,, 
However, one month later, the crude price declined sharply as reported 
in [17] on July 25,2008 that 
“Crude oil fell to a seven-week low as a report showed that OPEC is 
bolstering output to cut prices and fuel consumption in the U.S. and 
Asia drops. The OPEC increased output by 200, 000 barrels a day in 
July,... oil slipped more than $24 a barrel from the $147.27 record on 
July 11, as fuel use declined.” 
The volatility of the commodities prices provides the companies that 
consume them incentive to hold or release inventory. In [1], this incen-
tive is called the speculative motive. On one hand, there is a motive for 
1 
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holding inventory when the prices are rising rapidly. On the other hand, 
the companies may wish to release excess inventory when the prices are 
declining fast enough. Moreover, while the companies have speculative 
motive, they are not real speculators. That means they have liquidity 
constraints on borrowing, and they should not have short position in 
markets. Thus other than the risk from the uncertainty of the demand, 
it is also necessary to consider the risk of the speculative motive, which 
comes from the uncertainty of the price in the future. Hence, it is more 
complicated to control the inventory level in the environment where the 
commodities prices fluctuate. 
There are many factors that could influence the price of the energy com-
modities. We take crude as an example. First, the objective factors 
such as the currency exchange rates, the output policies of the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other irritants 
including a sudden rise in political tempers in oil-rich Middle East will 
instigate the commodity price. Secondly, the current fluctuation of 
the commodity price could add fuel to the work of market speculators, 
which in return would aggravating the price volatility. Third, as indi-
cated in [7], the surge of oil's price helped to send stocks amid fears 
that the U.S. economy could be in stagflation, i.e., the combination of 
inflation and slow growth. If that happened, it would add uncertainty 
to the oil's price in the future. Moreover, these above factors will work 
on for a long duration in the future due to the nonsubstitutability of 
the oil and the decreasing worldwide reserves. 
The crude price impresses the prices of its products such as gasoline and 
diesel oil. With data from [2], Figure 1.1 displays the volatility of con-
ventional gasoline price in New York Harbor spot exchange. Moreover, 
the setup cost incurred by trading in the exchange, which includes the 
cost to deliver the commodities, and the demand of the product of the 
companies are all influenced by the oil price. These also increase the 
risk faced by those companies and motivate us to explore the policy for 
the inventory systems, in order to determine how much commodities 
will be ordered or sold in the exchanges. 
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Figure 1.1: New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline Regular Spot Price, 
May-July 2008 
To model the dynamic price, setup cost and demand, here we intro-
duce a series of environment factors which affect the spot prices, setup 
cost and demand as in [16] and [19]. These factors are denoted by the 
state-of-the-world. They could be the fluctuating economic conditions, 
uncertain market conditions and so on, and they take effect by influ-
encing the distribution of the random variables of the price, setup cost 
and demand. The state-of-the-world of a period, which is also referred 
as period state in short, is revealed at the beginning of the period, with 
future states unknown but following a Markov process. 
Besides the volatility of the commodities prices, the existence of price 
gap between different spot exchanges is another motive of our work. As 
indicated in [5], companies are using different sources of supply with 
the ubiquitous presence of spot exchanges. Commonly there are three 
channels for commodities' transaction - contract markets, future mar-
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Spot Exchange 06/25/08 06/26/08 06/27/08 06/30/08 
NY Harbor 325.24 336.13 335.02 332.1 
U.S. Gulf Coast 326.99 338.18 338.37 334.5 
Los Angeles 347.74 353.43 351.12 348.25 
ARA 316.56 330.02 330.02 330.02 
Singapore 336.07 329.29 348.71 349.38 
Table 1.1: Conventional Gasoline Regular Spot Prices (Cents/Gallon) 
kets and spot markets. Different from the other two markets, the price 
in a spot market is determined by supply-demand balance. Rising price 
indicates that more supply is needed, and falling prices indicates that 
there is too much supply for the prevailing demand level. Since it is 
impossible for the spot exchanges to face the same supply-demand bal-
ance, the price gap arises. Table 1.1 illustrates the gap of conventional 
gasoline price, of which the data is from [2]. Therefore, our objective 
policy determines not only how much to trade in the spot exchange, 
and also which exchange(s) to trade at. 
Ill summary, our interest in this work is a discrete-time, single-item, 
single-location inventory system which can trade in UIQ different spot 
exchanges. The system has the borrowing liquidity constraint that 
when it sells it could not sell what it doesn't hold. The period state 
is revealed at the beginning of the period, so are the prices of the 
exchanges. A trading decision is made then, and the trade does not 
influence the price in the exchange. After that the demand is realized, 
and the leftover is held and unmet amount is fully backlogged. We find 
that the optimal trading policy is the generalized (s, S, H) policy. An 
(s, 5, H) policy means to make an order to bring the inventory level up 
to S when it is below 5, and make a sale to bring the level down to S 
when it is above H. The generalized (5, 5, H) policy is similar to the 
generalized (s, S) policy in [9] and [11], which has a series of threshold 
and target inventory levels. In our work these levels are dependent on 
the period state. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, 
we review the related literature, and then we introduce our model in 
Chapters. In Chapter 4, we present the technical results and establish 
the optimal policy of single-period problem and finite-period problem. 
We further give an algorithm in this chapter to derive the optimal 
policy. Finally we conclude and suggest the direction for future research 
in Chapter 5. 
• E n d of c h a p t e r . 
Chapter 2 
Background Study 
In [13] Scarf demonstrates the optimality of (s, S) policy for a class of 
finite-horizon periodic-review models with simplest type of non-linear 
ordering cost. Scarf's work gives one of the few fundamental results of 
inventory. And until today the dynamic (s, S) policy remains the best 
known result for dynamic control problems, although there have been 
some extensions in the past four decades. 
Later Porteus in [9] analyzes inventory models with concave order-
ing cost, which could arise from multiple exchanges. He demonstrates 
that a generalized (s, S) policy, which is with multiple-threshold s and 
multiple-target 5, is optimal for the periodic-review n-period problem 
with one-sided Polya density. Then in [10] he finds the generalized 
(s, S) policy optimal for the problem with uniform demand densities. 
There are some other literature focusing on multiple suppliers. [8 
assumes the existence of multiple setup costs, and in [4], the authors 
solve the replenish problem where there is a supplier with high variable 
cost but negligible fixed cost and another supplier with lower variable 
cost but substantial fixed cost, and they prove that the optimal policy 
is either to purchase exclusively from one of the suppliers or to buy 
from both suppliers. Furthermore, some literature like [21] focus on 
6 
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the related problem of purchasing from both regular supplier and spot 
market. However, most of these literature assume the setup cost and 
variable cost are constant over time. Though in [21] the unit price at 
the spot market is dependent on the period n, that in the long-term 
supply contract is fixed, and they have not considered the setup cost 
on the spot market. Similar to our work, [15] assumes the entry cost to 
the spot market, but their problem is one-period. Moreover, in all of 
the above papers concerning spot markets they only consider the side 
of replenishment. Therefore, our model is closer to the real world. 
At the side of dynamic economics environment, [19] and [16] consider 
an inventory model where the distribution of demand and the costs 
in successive period are dependent on a Markov Chain. [20] uses the 
Markovian stochastic process to decribe the evolution of the price state-
random-variable. There are also some papers concerning the model 
with discount opportunities of ordering cost such as [22] and [3]. Our 
work is more general than them in that we consider more than one 
available supplier in our model and multiple discount opportunities. 
To sum up, the model presented in the next chapter is more general 
than those by Porteus and [4] in that we consider state-dependent unit 
price and setup price, as well as demand distribution. And we extend 
the work of [16] to the extent in which multiple exchanges are available 
simultaneously, and also [22] and [3] to the extent in which multiple 
discount opportunities coexist and vary over time. Thus, this work 
enriches the literature of generalized inventory ordering policies and 
has wider application in the real world. 
• E n d of c h a p t e r . 
Chapter 3 
Model Formulation 
In this chapter, We first characterize the trading cost function in our 
model, and then we introduce the basic notations and functions to solve 
the problem we bring forward, and finally we give the optimal equation 
which plays the key role in solving the problem. 
We analyze a discrete-time, single-item, single-location inventory sys-
tem which can trade a commodity in any exchanges from the set 
Mo = {1,2 , . . . , mo}. 
The system has the borrowing liquidity constraint, thus when it sells it 
could only sell what is on hand. Different from the exist models with 
multiple suppliers such as [11] and [18], the unit price and setup cost 
fluctuate at each period in our model, and to some extent these costs 
could be treated as stochastic variables. Here we introduce a series 
of environment factors which affect the distribution of these random 
variables, and as in [16], these factors are represented by the state-
of-the-world. To be more specific, if the state at period n is z, then 
the setup cost for exchange m is ⑷，and the market unit price is 
We denote the realization of them at the beginning of period 
n as KnjJS) and they have siipremums Kn.mii) and 
and infimums Kn,m{i) and c„’,„(i). We assume that for different n, m 
8 
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and i, Cn,m(^ ) share the same supremum and infimum. Thus we could 
simplify and Cn,m('i) as c and c. 
3.1 Trading Cost Function 
The trading cost comprises the setup cost and the variable cost, and the 
variable cost equals to the product of the unit price and trading quan-
tity. The positive trading quantity means ordering decision, negative 
quantity means selling decision, and negative cost means profit. We as-
sume if the system make an ordering decision then no selling decision 
can be made in the same period, and vice versa. This assumption is to 
eliminate the arbitrage opportunity and it makes sense. Though the 
trade may not influence the prices at the exchanges, the prices change 
so quickly that the decision under the altered prices can be considered 
as in the next period. Given the trading quantity, the decision that 
which exchange to trade at is based on their trading costs. In other 
words, an exchange will only be considered if its trading cost is no more 
than at any other exchanges. The trading cost function in period n is 
in the following form: 
, \ f •， X - 0 , 、 
Cn(hx) = { (3.1) 
where i is the period state and x is the trading quantity. 
While the ordering cost function in [9] and [11] is similar to (3.1), they 
assume that the variable costs of M suppliers are descent order and 
setup cost on ascent order, i. e., 
ci > C2 > • • - > CM > 0，and 0 < Ki < 1<2 < • • • < KM-
However, we don't use this assumption to retain a concave trading 
cost function for two reasons. First, under a competitive economic 
environment, the price and setup cost, especially of the commodity, 
fluctuate at a rapid speed. Therefore it is hard for the exchanges or 





！ / Kt 
^ . 
Y ‘ 
Figure 3.1: Trading Cost Function 
suppliers to keep the cost well-ordered like this. Second, even without 
this assumption, we can also keep the trading cost function concave. 
In fact, under (3.1), there may exist some exchanges that would never 
be considered to trade at. For example, if the unit price and setup cost 
of Exchange 1, 2 and 3 have the relationships as following, 
ci > C2 > C3 and 1<2 > Ks > ^i, 
then the firm will consider Exchange 1 when selling and Exchange 1, 
3 when purchasing, and will never consider Exchange 2. Thus (3.1) 
ensures the trading cost function concave in x. 
We further give the Figure 3.1, which could show that the trading cost 
function is concave. 
For this trading cost function, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 1 The trading cost function Cn(i, x) is subadditive, i. e., 
Cnii, X + Ij) < C„(z, x) + Cn(z,ij) foT any x,y>0 and x,ij < 0. 
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Proof . First we prove that for any 9 e [0,1], Cn(z, 6x) > OCn{i, x). 
That ' s because when x ^ 0, 9x) = + 9cn,m('^)x) 
and 9Cn{i,x) = Kn,m(i) + Ocn,m{i)x); when 2； 二 0, C;,.(�<9:c) 二 
eCnihx) = 0. 
For any x,?/ > 0, or any x,y < 0 let x = 6{x-\-y) and y = {l — 9){x + y). 
It is obvious that when x and y have the same sign, or one of them is 
0 , 9 e [0,1]. Then we have 
Cn[i,x) > eCn{i,x + y� 
CnihV) > {l-e)Cn{i.X^y) 
By summing up the two equations above the theory applies. • 
Theorem 1 says that if a company needs to replenish or sell some 
amount of inventory, it is better to do that in one time than in several 
times. 
3.2 Notations and Optimality Equation 
We introduce the notation as follows. N is the total number of peri-
ods. Since we consider the finite horizon problem, we have N < oo. 
Denote { 1 , 2 , . . . , / } as the finite collection of possible period states 
and in the state of period n. Thus, {z„|n = 1 , 2 , . . . , N) composes a 
Markov chain, and we let P = (Pij)/x/ be its transition matrix. Dn is 
the demand in period n, Dn > 0 and let denote the mean of Dn. 
Here we suppose E{Dn\in = ^ has an upper boundary for any i. The 
demand is dependent on the period state, so we denote </>i’n(.) the con-
ditional probability density function of when in = z, and $i，n(.) the 
distribution function corresponding to (/>《，“•）. Let be the inventory 
level at the beginning of period before trading decision making, and yn 
be the inventory level after trading decision is realized. Because the 
inventory system could not sell what it doesn't hold, yn > Xn- C{x) is 
the holding and backlogging cost function incurred at the end of the 
CHAPTER 3. MODEL FORMULATION 12 
period with ending inventory level x. Finally, we denote a to be the 
discount factor and 0 < a < 1. 
The sequence is arranged as follows. The state of a period is revealed, so 
are the unit price and setup cost of each of the mo exchanges. Trading 
decision is made, order arrives or sale goes instantaneously, and the 
period's demand follows by. Unsatisfied demands are fully backlogged. 
It is important to point out that the period state is only revealed at 
the beginning of that period, with future states unknown but following 
a Markov process. Please refer to [12] for the characters of Markov 
process. 
The objective is to minimize the total cost in this inventory system. Let 
f n ( h x ) represent the minimum total cost from period n onward where 
the period begins with state in and inventory level The function 
gn，m is denoted as below: 
I 
9n,m{h x) ：= Cn,m(i){x + Mn) + ^ x ) + a [ ( j , x). 
j=l 
We define Gn,m ： { 1 , . . . , / } x i?, by 
Gn,m{h y) •= Egn�m(i, y 一 Ai) 
POO 
= / 9n,m{i^y -
Jo 
It should be noticed that 
Gn,m{i,y�一 Cm{i)x 
is the cost from period n onward while bringing inventory level from 
X io y and trading in period n is restricted to exchange m. By simple 
calculation, we get that 
/ 
Gn.mihy) = Cn,m{i)y + L(hy) + ( ^ ^ P i j E [ f n + l { j , y - D n ) \ i n = ？:], (3.2) 
j=l 
where L(z, x) = E[JC(X — D)\I . 
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Define the function by 
G* (i,x) = inf [Kn,m.{i) + Gn,m{i^y)]). 
y 狄 
Thus, Xn) — is the minimum cost from period n on-
ward while restricted to exchange m in period n. Moreover, it is worthy 
emphasizing the usual logic that if we are going to order/sell, we want 
to minimize Gn,m{h .) moving to the right/left, and it should be checked 
whether the saving could cover the setup cost. 
By now, we can get the optimality equation as 
fn{in�Xn) = mill [ - c „ ’ 爪 + G 二爪x ” . ) ] . (3.3) 
me{l’...’mo} 
• E n d of c h a p t e r . 
Chapter 4 
Optimal Policy 
111 this chapter we first establish some useful technical result and ad-
ditional assumptions to derive the optimal policy. Then we focus on 
the single-period problem and investigate the possible structure of the 
optimal trading policy. Then we prove that the state-dependent gen-
eralized (s, S, H) policy is optimal for the finite-period problem under 
some assumptions, and we give an algorithm to derive the optimal 
policy at the end of this chapter. 
4.1 Preliminary Assumption and Results 
4.1.1 Generalized (s, S, H) Policy 
We give the details of generalized (s, S, H) policy in the following def-
inition. 
Definit ion 1 A decision rule 6 is called generalized (s, S, H) policy if 
there exist rui and m? where 
S\ < S2 < • • • < Smi < Hmi < Hmi-l < • • • < i/2 < 
^rn2 < 5 m 2 - l < • • • < < S i < Sm^ + l < • • < +m2 
14 
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of A Generalized (s, 5, H) Policy 
and 
Sm2 < •57712-1 < • • < Si < Hmi < H爪广i ' • * < 
< 5*2 < • • • < Smi < Smi + 1 < • • • < 1+7712 
such that 
‘ i f x > H , 
Si if Hi<x < Hi-i for i = 2 , . . . , mi 
5 � = ^ 'S'mi+m2 ^ ^1712 
Sm.i+i if Si+I < X < Si for i = 1 , 2 , . . . , 3^2-1 
X otherwise. 
\ 
Figure 4.1 displays the working of a generalized (s, H) policy for 
mi = 1712 = 3, where the arrows' bases indicate the inventory level 
before trading and their points indicate the level after trading. Here 
the trade includes buying and selling. 
4.1.2 Polya Distribution and Quasi-K-convex 
Polya distribution is PFqq distribution, and a Polya random variable 
is a random variable with Polya distribution. PFn distributions, which 
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are also called Polya frequency functions of order n, have their elab-
orate definition in [6]. As the definitions are difficult to understand 
and have little with our objective, here we only give their equivalent 
characterizations, which are more intuitively understandable. 
Lemma 1 A Polya distribution consists solely of translations and con-
volutions of exponentials, reflected exponentials and normals. A Polya 
random variable consists of the sum of a translated normal, exponen-
tials and reflected exponentials. A positive Polya random variable con-
sists of a positive translation of the sum of exponentials. 
This lemma is from [14], and to develop the positive Polya random 
variables' smoothing properties we first have the following important 
lemma for the exponential random variables. 
Lemma 2 If f is continuous on the real axes, and g is defined by 
g{x) := Ef{x — X), where X is an exponential random variable with 
mean j, then g is continuously differentiable and 
g'(x) = X[fix)-g{x)]. 
This lemma implicates powerful smoothing property of exponential ran-
dom variable. The derivative of g is proportional between f and itself. 
If g is below /，then g is increasing to approach / , and vice versa. The 
more distance between f{x) and g(x), the faster g get close to f . Thus 
g is smoother than f. 
To develop the smoothing action of a positive Polya random variable 
on the quasi-/^-convex function, we first give the related definitions 
and properties. 
Definit ion 2 A function f : R R is non-K-decreasing if there is 
f(x)<K + f{y) 
CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL POLICY 17 
for any x <y. If f ( - x ) is non-K-decreasing then f{x) is called non-
K-increasing. 
Definit ion 3 A function f : R — R is quasi-K-convex with changeover 
at a if f is decreasing on (一oo，a] and non-K-decreasing on [a, oo). 
To establish our work we need the well-known properties of quasi-
AT-convex functions below, of which the proof could be found in the 
appendix of [9 . 
Proposi t ion 1 (a) If f is K-convex then f is quasi-K-convex. 
(b) If f is decreasing or non-K-decreasing then f is quasi-K-convex. 
(c) If f is quasi-K -convex and 7〉0，then 7/ is quasi-j K-convex. 
(d) The sum of a quasi-K-convex function with changeover at a and a 
quasi-k-convex function with changeover at a is quasi八K + k)-convex 
with changeover at a. 
(e) If f{x) is quasi-K -convex with changeover at a, and /(—x) is quasi-
K-convex with changeover at —b, then a < b. 
Lemma 3 f{x) is continuous and quasi-K-convex with changeover at 
a, and f{—x) is quasi-K -convex with changeover at —b for some a <h, 
if and only if it satisfies following properties: 
(1) f ( x ) is decreasing on (—00, a]/ 
(2) f ( x ) is increasing on [6, +00); 
(3) There exists S G [a, b] that minimize f [x]，and for any x G [a, b], 
f{x)<f{S)-hK. 
P r o o f . The is derived directly by the definition of quasi-ZC-
convex. For the proof of "<(=" part, suppose there exist x,y e [a, 00), 
X < y, such that f ( x ) > f{y) + K, then y must be greater than 6, since 
if y < b, then a < x < y < b, smd we have f{y) + k > f{S) + K > f{x). 
However, when y > b, ii x is also greater than b, we have f{y) + A : � 
f{y) > /⑷； i f X < 6, f{y) + K > m + K > f{S) ^K > f{x). 
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Figure 4.2: f{x) Is Quasi-ZlT-convex and f{—x) Is Quasi-iC-convex 
Thus f{x) is non-A'-decreasing on [a, +oo). Similarly, f{x) is non-K-
increasing on (—oo, 6]. f{x) is continuous and quasi-i^-convex with 
changeover at a, and f(—x) is quasi-/�-convex with changeover at —b. 
• 
Figure 4.2 illustrates that f{x) is continuous and quasi-/C-convex with 
changeover at a, /(—x) is quasi-/�-convex with changeover at —b and 
a < b. Please notice here that the changeover points are not unique. 
In this figure, any point in the interval [s, a] is the changeover point of 
/ (x ) , and any point in [-H, -5] is the changeover point of f{-x). 
Lemma 4 If f{x) is quasi-K-convex with changeover at a, and f{—x) 
is quasi-K-convex with changeover at —h, D is an exponential random 
variable, then there exist some a! > a and h' > h such that g{x)= 
Ef{x — D) is quasi-K-convex with changeover at a', g{~x) is quasi-
K-convex with changeover at —b'. 
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Proof. By Lemma 3, f{x) is decreasing on (—oo, a] and increasing 
on [6, +oo). There exist S G [a, b] that minimize / (x) , and for any 
X € [a, 6], f{S) K > f{x). We divide the proof of this lemma into 
3 parts. 1. There exists some a' > a such that g{x) is decreasing on 
(—oo, a']. 2. There exists some h' > h such that g{x) is increasing on 
b', oo) and 3. There exists S' G [a'，b'] that minimize and for any 
xela\blg{x)<giS') + K. 
1. By Lemma 2, g'{x) = X[f{x) — g(x)]. Here D is an exponential 
random variable, so 入 > 0. As f{x) is decreasing on (—oo,a]’ there 
must be some r > a such that g{x) is decreasing on (—oo, ？^] too. We 
denote a' as 
a' \= max{r\g{x) is decreasing on (—oo,r]}. 
So a' > a and g(x) is decreasing on (—oo, a'. 
2. As g{—x) — Ef{—x — D), we define f{—x) = h[x), so g{—x)= 
Eh{x D) = Eh[x — (-Z))], and g'{-x) = -X[h{x) - g{-x)[= 
—X[f{—x) — g(—x)]. Since /(—x) is decreasing on(—oo, —6] and —A < 
0’ there must be some —r < —b such that g{—x) is decreasing on 
(—oo, —r] too. We denote b' as 
b' := min{7^\g(—x) is decreasing on (—oo, —r]}. 
So b' > b and g{x) is increasing on oo). 
3. As g{x) is continuous, decreasing on (—oo, a'] and increasing on 
oo), g{x) must have a global minimizer on [a', 6'], denote it as S'. 
So = \[f{S') - g{S')] = 0. So g{S') = f{S') > f{S). 
Case 1. If there is no local maximizer of g{x) on [a', b'], then g{x) is 
decreasing on (—oo, S'] and increasing on [S", oo). So a' = S' = b\ and 
it is clearly for any x G [a', g{x) < g{S') + K. 
Case 2. If there is some local maximizers of g{x) on [a', then without 
loss of generality, choose the one that maximizes g{x) on [a', b'] and 
denote it as S[. Then there must exist some local maximizers of f(x) 
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on [a, b] and we choose the one that maximizes f{x) on [a, b] and denote 
it as 5i. Since g'{S[) = Elf{S[) — p(5；)] = 0, g(S[) = f{S{) < 
f ( S ) + K < g{S') + K. Therefore, in this case for any x G [a', h'], 
9{x) < giS') + K. 
To sum up, there exist some a' > a and b' > b such that g{x)= 
Ef(x — D) is quasi-/(-convex with changeover at a', g{—x) is quasi-A'-
convex with changeover at h'. • 
Corollary 1 If f{x) is quasi-K-convex with changeover at a, and f{—x) 
is quasi-K-convex with changeover at —b, X is a positive Polya ran-
dom variable, then there exist some a' > a and b' > b such that 
g{x) = Ef(x - X) is quasi-K-convex with changeover at a', g(-x) 
is quasi-K-convex with changeover at —h'. 
Proof. By Lemma 1, X can be represented as a positive translation of 
the sum of exponentially distributed random variables. So its density 
can be represented recursively as a sequence of convolutions. Therefore, 
we can apply Lemma 4 recursively, and the corollary applies. 口 
Figure 4.3 illustrates a comparison of the figures of f{x) in Figure 4.2 
and g{x) = Ef{x — X), and shows that Corollary 1 applies. 
4.1.3 Assumptions 
We have the following assumption of the demand. 
Assumpt ion 1 At each period n the distribution of demand Dn is a 
positive Polya random variable. 
Furthermore, we need the assumptions below to make the optimal pol-
icy turn out to be of generalized (s, S, H)-type. 
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a' h' ^ 
Figure 4.3: f{x) and g{x) 二 Ef(:r 一 X) 
Assumpt ion 2 L(z, x) is continuous in x for any period state i G 
{ 1 , 2 , . . . , / } . 
Remark 1 The continuity of L{i, x) = E[JC{X — Dn)\in = i] does not 
need the holding and shortage cost function C{x) to be continuous on 
X. Specifically, C{x) could often be piecewise continuous on a countable 
set in the real world. 
Assumpt ion 3 C{x) gets sufficiently large for large absolute argu-
ments of X, or equivalently, 
lim C{x) -> +00. (4.1) 
X—>oo 
Remark 2 This assumption ensures it is never optimal to order or 
sell an infinite amount. 
We use the following function to rearrange the index order of the ex-
changes. 
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Definit ion 4 For each period state i G {1,2,...，/}，define function 
i : MQ MQ such that 
> Ci(2)� 2 … 2 
Remark 3 In the following part of this thesis, when i is a number it 
means the period state, and when i is a function it is to rearrange the 
index order of the exchanges. 
Remember that c and c are the supremum and infimum of for 
any n, m and i. We have the following assumptions. 
Assumpt ion 4 At any period n, for each market m and period state 
i, (1 — a)cx + C[x) is non-{l — a)Kn,m{i)-decreasing on [a, +oo), and 
{c — ac)x-\-C{x) is decreasing on (—oo, a]. Here a is a scalar and a > 0. 
Assumpt ion 5 At any period n, for each market m and period state 
i, (1 — OL)CX + C[x) is non-{l — a)Kn,m.{'^)-'>'f^creasing on (—oo, b], and 
(c — ac)x-\-C(x) is increasing on [6, +oo). Here b is a scalar and b > a. 
Remark 4 The two assumptions above ensure that for any realiza-
tion of the random variables Kn,m{i) o,nd Kn,m{i) o/nd 
fulfill that (1 — + JO(x) is non-{l — a)Kn,m{i)-decreasing 
on [a,+00), and non-{l — a)Kn,m.(J)-increasing on (—oo, b]. More-
over, (Cn,i�(i) — + ^^ decreasing on ( -oo , a], and 
(Cn,i(7no)(0 — + A工)“ increasing on [6, +oo). 
Finally, we have the assumption about the unit price and setup cost of 
the exchange markets. 
Assumpt ion 6 For any period n and period state i, the realization of 
unit prices and setup cost of the exchange markets in that period are 
different from each other. In other words, for any m + m!, there exists 
Cn’m(0 ^ Cn^m'i'i) and I<n,m(j) + 
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Remark 5 This assumption does make sense. First, if at the beginning 
of a period two exchange markets have the same unit price and same 
setup cost, then these two markets could be considered as one; and if 
two exchanges with the same unit price have different setup cost, then 
the one with the higher setup cost would not be considered. Second, 
the setup cost mainly includes the market entry cost and transportation 
cost, which are always different for different exchange markets. 
Let VT{X) denote the terminal value if the leftover inventory at the end 
of the last period is x. We'll show that if VT hold certain characteristics 
the generalized (s, S, H) policy would be optimal. 
4.2 Single Period Problem 
We consider the single period problem in this section and for conve-
nience we rewrite the optimality equation (3.3) and other functions 
without the time index as follows 
二 p i n (4.2) 
me{l，...’mo} 
where 
= inf [K,n{i) + Gm{i.y)l (4.3) 
roo 
Gm{i,x) = / gmii,y —工)她 iA工) 
Jo 
= + L(z, x) + aEvrix - D), (4.4) 
and 
gm{i, x) = c,n(i){x + Ii) + C(x) + avr{x) (4.5) 
where D is the demand during the period and L(i, x) 二 — D)\i . 
The following lemma shows that if restricted to order from exchange 
market m it is optimal to follow a state dependent (smii), Hm.{i)) 
policy. 
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Lemma 5 For any m G {1 ,2 , . . . , M}, if Gm{i, x) is continuous and 
quasi-Km{i)-convex with changeover at am[i) on x for each i e {1,2，...,/}， 
am(i) > 0，and Gm{h is also quasi-Km{i)-convex with changeover 
at —bm(i) on x for each i, then there exist Smii), Hm{i)) and 
Sm(i) < CLm{i) < Sm(j) < < Hm{i) foT�ecLch % and m such that 
if the initial inventory level is below Sm(i) it is optimal to order up 
to Sm(i), if it is above Hm{i) then sell down to Sm(i) and do nothing 
otherwise. 
Proof. Gm{i, •) is quasi-Km(~convex with changeover at —x) 
is also quasi-/^Tn(z)-convex with changeover at 一 S o we have 
am.(i) < bm(i)- By Lemma 3, .) is decreasing on ( -oo , a„i(z)], in-
creasing on lbm.(i), oo), non-Km.(i)-decreasing and non-i^爪⑴-increasing 
on [ a m � A n � ] . W e denote Sm(i) the miriimizer of Gm(h .), so there 
must be 爪⑴ G [<2 (^2), and Smif) > 0. Noting that there may 
more that one minimizer of of Gm{h •)，here we let 
Smii) '•= inin{x|a: minimizes Gm(i, •) and x > a}. 
In other words, Sm{i) is the least one of the minimizers. By Assump-
tion 3，we have liiHa；—00 re) = +00, and by the third property of 
Lemma 3, there exist Sm{i) G (-oo,a,„(z)l such that Gm{i,Sm{i))= 
Gm(h Sm(i)) + KjJSy And there exist Hm.{i) € 00) such that 
Gmii^Hmii)) = GJ^i, S J J ) � + Km{i)- In summary s川.(?:）< a爪,(?:）< 
Smii) < bm.{i) < Hm.{l). 
Once we make a purchase decision, we want to minimize Gm(h •) mov-
ing to the right, thus the best we can do is ordering up to 
Similarly, once we make a sale decision, we want to minimize •) 
moving to the left, thus the best we can do is selling down to Sm[i). 
However, if the saving is less than the setup cost Km(i) it is no worth to 
do this. Thus, if x < Sm(i), Gm{i,x) > = G„,.(�5•爪.(?:)）+ 
it is optimal to order up to Sm{i)] if Sm{i) < x < 爪⑷)， 
when X G (5^,(2), a), < G^ii^ Sjn{i)) = Gm{i, S m i f ) � + K爪⑷， 
when X G [a, Gm(j) is noii-/<m�-decreasing, also Gm,(i, x) < 
Gm�i, SO it is better not to order; if a; > Hm(i), Gm(i, x) > 
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Gmih Hm(i)) = Gmih 'S'm(^)) + it is optimal to sell down to 
Sm�i)\ if Sm{i) < X < Hm{i)), when x G ( 6 , ^ ( z ) , G m . ( i , x ) < 
Gmih Hm{i)) = Gm{i,Sm[i)) + Kmij), when X e Gm{i) 
is non-Km(i)-increasing, also Gm{i,x) < Gm{i, Sm{i)) + K ^ i j ) so it is 
better not to sell. 
In summary, when the inventory level at the beginning of the period is 
below it is optimal to order up to 饥⑴；if it is over Hm{i), it is 
optimal to sell down to otherwise it is better to do nothing. • 
Proposi t ion 2 5^ (1) (z) < S i � { j ) < < 5*i(m� )� for every i G 
{ 1 , 2 , . . . , / } 
Proof. It follows from (4.4) that for exchange i{r) and 
Gi(r){hx) - G i � = - Ci(t)];r. 
Since c咖）> q � for r < it follows that 
d[Gi{r){i,x) - � • 
dx — ’ 
which implicate the minimizer of G i � ( i ’ a : ) is no more than that of 
Gi�(i，rc). Therefore, from the definition i{-) we have 
Siii){i) < S i � i j ) S … < � . 
• 
In [9] and [4], they assume that the exchange offering cheaper unit 
price always charged more on setup cost. It is reasonable to make 
this assumption in their work. That 's because when only considering 
replenishment, a market which offers both higher setup cost and unit 
price could be intuitionally excluded. However, in our model we also 
consider to sell inventory to the market, so the market with higher 
setup cost and unit price may be considered. Therefore, we don't 
assume this kind of constraints between the unit price and setup cost 
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of the exchange markets, only we need the Assumption 6 that different 
markets have different setup costs and unit prices. Yet we still apply 
the following lemma to pre-shrink the scope of right exchanges when 
the set of available exchanges is MQ = {1 ,2 , . . . , mo}. 
Lemma 6 For any state i G {1, 2 , . . . , / } , when the unit prices of the 
exchange markets are realized, there exist subsets Mi and M) of MQ, 
such that when the company makes the sale decision, it only sell to the 
markets in Mi； when it makes purchase decision, it only purchase from 
the markets in M2, and there are only one element in Mi pj M2. 
Proof. We prove this lemma by constructing Mi and M) to fulfill the 
the lemma. First we construct Mi. Put the market with the highest 
unit price of MQ into Mi. Then do the following recursively. Compare 
the setup cost of the left market whose unit price is the highest in MQ 
with that of the market whose unit price is the lowest in Mi. If the 
former is less than the latter, put the market with the former setup 
cost into Ml； otherwise drop it off MQ. In this way we get Mi such 
that for any two markets in Mi, the one with higher unit price has a 
higher setup cost, and vice versa; and for any market left in Mq, there 
must be one in Mi with a higher unit price but lower setup cost than 
that. Therefore, when the company makes the sale decision, it will not 
consider the left markets in MQ but only sell to the markets in Mi. 
And it is easy to prove the one with the lowest setup cost of MQ is in 
Ml. 
We construct M2 similarly. Put the market with the lowest unit price 
of MQ into M2. Then do the following recursively. Compare the setup 
cost of the left market whose unit price is the lowest in Mq with that 
of the market whose unit price is the lowest in Mi. If the former is less 
than the latter, put the market with the former setup cost into M : � 
otherwise drop it off MQ. In this way we get M2 such that for any two 
markets in M2, the one with higher unit price has a lower setup cost, 
and vice versa; and for any market left in Mq, there must be one in 
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Ml with a lower unit price and lower setup cost than that. Therefore, 
when the company makes the purchase decision, it will not consider 
the left markets in MQ but only sell to the markets in M). And it is 
easy to prove the one with the lowest setup cost of MQ is in M�. 
Now it comes to prove the one with the lowest setup cost of Mq is 
the only one element in Mi p| M2. Assume it is Exchange 1. Suppose 
there is another element in Mi pj M2, assume it is Exchange 2. Since 
Exchange 1, 2 are in Mi and Ki < K2, then c! < C2. However, since 
they are also in M2, we have C i � C 2 . It is a contradiction. Therefore, 
the only one element in Mi 门 M? is the one with the lowest setup cost 
in MQ. Except this element, the unit price of other elements in Mi is 
high than that in M2. • 
The lemma below gives the conditions that ensure the generalized 
(s, 5, H) policy is optimal. And in its proof process we provide a 
method not only to calculate the threshold of the policy, but also to 
decide which exchange to trade at for certain initial inventory level. 
Lemma 7 IfGm{i, x) is continuous and quasi-K^(i)-convex with change-
over at (am{i) > Oj on x for each i € {1 ,2 , . . . , / } and each 
m 6 {1, 2 , . . . , M}, and Gm{i, -x) is also quasi-Kconvex with 
changeover at —bm(i) on x for each i and m, then there exists an opti-
mal decision rule inform of state-dependent generalized (s, 5, N) policy 
for the one-period problem. 
P r o o f . First we consider the purchase side. Fix the period state ？ 
by Lemma 5 and Lemma 6，it is either optimal to order nothing or to 
make an order to bring the inventory level to 爪 ⑷ > 0) for 
some m e M2. In other words, if we going to use exchange m e M2 
to order we should bring the level to Sm{f). Fix t G {1 ,2 , . . . , M] 
and consider arbitrary r < t and r G {1 ,2 , . . . , M}. Remember from 
Definition 5, <:�(�)(” > C i� ( i ) . While the initial inventory is at x, the 
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saving from using exchange i{t) compared using i(r) is 
� r ) ⑷ - � ) ⑷ + ( C i ⑷ ⑷ - Q ⑷ ⑶ 工 + ( 仏 ( r ) ⑷ ) - G 明 ( i ’ < S 明 ⑷ ) . 
Let 
,.�一 / ( ( r ) � - � � + %)⑷）—Gi{t){i, 6*明⑷) 
邮)洲⑴：二 Q d Q � � 
(4.6) 
Thus, Si(r),i{t){i) is the initial inventory level at which there is no dif-
ference between using exchange i{r) and i{t). 
When C i ( r ) � > Q � ( i ) , it is better to use exchange i{t) than to use i{r) 
iff the initial level x < S i ( r ) ’ i � � . W e let 
⑴•= mi i i (S i� ( i j i i i j i f igS i^ .^Mj-
Thus, if X < s j " � � it is better to use exchange i(t) than any ex-
changes whose variable cost is larger than Cj⑴⑷；and if x > s;�(i) it 
is better to do something other than use exchange i(t). Therefore, if 
< sj"⑴⑷，exchange i(r) will never be used and can be ignored 
when identifying the optimal policy for this period. 
Prom above it is in the same way to eliminate exchanges who will never 
be used at any period states. After eliminating any exchanges that need 
not be used, by re-indexing we have active exchange set M': < M2 such 
that 
4 m ; ) � < • • • < s ^ a ) � < 碍 1 ) � <•••< 碍 M ; ) � . 
If X > St*(i)(i)，it is optimal to do nothing; if s!*�(i) < x < it 
is optimal to order up to � ( i ) in exchange i{t) after re-indexing of 
M2. And please notice that here s ; � ( i ) and Si(i)(i)* are corresponding 
to the market with the lowest setup cost in MQ. 
Similarly, for the sale side we have active exchange set M[ < Mi such 
that 
5T(*i)� < • • < � < < • • < 
If X < it is optimal to do nothing; if < x < 
it is optimal to sell down to in exchange i{t) after re-indexing of 
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M[. And please notice that here and 似 a r e correspond-
ing to the market with the lowest setup cost in MQ. By lemma 2, we 
have < = < SO the optimal policy is 
generalized (5, S, H)-type. Suppose there are m[ elements in A4[ and 
m'2 elements in M!^ . We re-index the threshold and target inventory 
levels, and get 
Si<S2<---< < Hm.> < H爪,广 1 <---<H2<H, 
SM'2 < < • • • < S2 < S i < + 1 < ' • < SM[+M'^ 
and 
Sm'2 < 6V2-I < • • < Si < Hm[ < 丑m;-l ... S 付1 
< < • • • < Sm[ = Sm.\+1 < • • < Sm[+m'^ 
These threshold and target inventory levels are all dependent of period 
state i. • 
Denote V* as the set of continuous functions / : R —> M such that 
for any m and z, for the scalar a and b define in Assumption 4 and 5, 
0 < a < 6, the following characters apply. 
(1) cx + f{x) is decreasing on ( -oo , a]; 
(2) cx + f{x) is increasing on [6’ oo); 
(3) Cm{i)x-\-f{x) is both non-/^7n(^)-decreasing and non-KVn(i)-increasing 
on (a, b). 
Theorem 2 IfvT e V*, then a state-dependent generalized (s, 5, H) 
policy is optimal for the single period problem. 
Proof. For each period state z, by rewriting the equation of gm(h 
we get 
GM{I, X ) = c爪⑷Ai + [(1 — a)c„,.(i)x + £(;r)] + a[c爪,�a: + VT(X)' 
By Assumption 4 and 5, (1 - a)cm(i)cc + £(x) is non-(l - a)Kjn(i)-
decreasing on (a, +oo) and non-(l — a)Km(0-ii^creasing on (—oo, 6). 
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Therefore gm.{i, x) is non-/(爪(^-decreasing and (z)-increasing 
on (a, b) by Proposition 1(c). Similarly gmihx) can be decomposed 
into 
9m{hx) = Cm{i)lJ. + [(c - ac)x + C{x)' 
-\-(cm{i) - c)x + a[cx + Vr{x). 
Because (c — ac)x + JC{X) is decreasing on (—00, a] by Assumption 4, 
cx + VT{X) is decreasing on (—00, a] as VT G V*, and {cm{i) — c)x is 
decreasing on R. Each term on the righthand side of the equation 
above is decreasing on (—00, a]. Also, 
+ (Cm�—C)x + a\cx + V T ( X ) . 
Since {c—ac)x-\-C(x) and cxi-VT(x) is increasing on [5, 00), (c饥(i)一 
is increasing on M. Each term on the righthand side of the equation 
above is increasing on [6,00). 
Hence Qmih is quasi-J^rn,(^-convex with changeover at a, and Qmih 
is q u a s i - � - c o n v e x with changeover at —b. By (4.4), Lemma 4 
and Assumption 1, Gm{h is quasi-Km.(i)-convex with changeover at 
for some am{i) > a, and —x) is quasi-Z^m,(z)-convex with 
changeover at for some 6^.(2) > b for each m and each i. Thus, 
by Lemma 7, a state-dependent generalized (s, 5, H) policy is optimal 
for this problem. • 
4.3 Finite-Period Problem 
We consider the model over a finite horizon, i.e., N < +00, and suppose 
all the assumptions in Section 4.1 are also applied in this section. And 
we further have some other assumptions in this section. 
For 2 G { 1 , 2 , . . . , / } and n G {1 ,2 , . . . , N), denote 
I<n{i) •= max[/<„’m�]and K j j ) •= 
m. m 
CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL POLICY 31 
We make a slight change on V* in Section 4.2. For i e { 1 , 2 , . . . , / } 
and n G {1 ,2 , . . . , N}, denote V*^^ as the set of continuous functions 
/ : M R such that there exist two sequences of number {an(z)} and 
{6„(i)}, an{i) < bn{i) and f satisfies 
(1) cx + f{x) is decreasing on ( -oo , � ] ; 
(2) cx + f{x) is increasing on [6^(2), +cxd)； 
(3) Both cx + f{x) and cx + f{x) are non-Kn(z)-decreasing and iion-
K力 - increas ing on (a„(z), bn{i)). 
And we denote V/J+i�：= V^ * and fN+i{h = for any i. Thus 
a/v+i(i) = a, = b and Kj\/+i(i) = for any i. 
Assumpt ion 7 For any period state G { 1 , 2 , . . . , / } and any n G 
{1, 2 , . . . , TV — 1}，we have 
• > l^iU). 
Assumption 7 ensures that the setup cost is decreasing as the time 
lapses. With := � ] ’ ^ mini[a„(i)], bn -.= m a x i [ � � 
and bn ：二 mini [&„(�)],we further need to make slight changes on As-
sumption 4 and 5. 
Assumpt ion 8 At any period n, n € {1, 2 , . . . , A '^+l}； fo7�each market 
m and period state i, (1 — A)cx + JC{X) is non-{\ — a)Kn{I)-decreasing 
on [an, +00)，and (c - ac)x + C(x) is decreasing on {—oo.on • 
Assumpt ion 9 At any period n, n e {1’ 2 ’ . . . , A^+1}，for each market 
m and period state i, (1 - a)cx + C(x) is non-{l — a)Knji)-increasing 
on (-00, bn], and (c — ac)x + C{x) is increasing on +00). 
Remark 6 Assumption 8 and 9 are stricter than Assumption 4 and 
5, though they appear to be vague. It is because that we have not given 
the explicit expression of an and bn by now. However, if an and bn are 
not infinite and have limitary for any n, the two assumptions above are 
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still reasonable. In the lemma below we give the explicit expression of 
CLn cmd bn and indicate they are not infinite. 
Lemma 8 If for some n G {1, 2’...，iV}, /n+i (?;，.）G "14*+1’�for any 
i E { 1 , 2 , . . . , I}, then the following properties hold. 
(a) gn,m{h is quasi-Kn,m{i)-convex with changeover at and 
9n,m.{h is quasi-Kn,m{'i')-convex with changeover at —6“’川,� for 
each i and m. 
(b) Gn,m{h is quasi-Kjn(i)-convex with changeover at an,m{i) and 
Gn,m{h —2：) is quasi-Km{i)-convex with changeover at —6„,’7„� for each 
i and m. Here an,m{i) > and bn,m{i) > 
(c) There exist a state-dependent generalized (s, S, H) policy that is op-
timal in the nth period. 
(d) fnih •) G for any i e { I , 2 , . . . J } . 
Proof, (a) Rewrite gn,m{h as 
/ 
Then it is easy to prove that gn,m{h is decreasing on (—cx), a„+i . 
Similarly gn,m{hx) is increasing on +oo). gn,m{hx could also be 
written as 
I 
gn,m(i, x) 二 c „ ’ 爪 ⑷ � : [ P i j [C,,.，爪⑴:r+/n+l(j，x). 
As Cn,m(J')x + fn+iU,工)is 11011-i^i+i(j)-decreasing and 11011-/(^ +1 (j)-
increasing on (an+iC；.)，�+i(J.))’ it is also n o n - & � - d e c r e a s i n g and 
non-Kn(z)-increasing on Moreover, by Assumption 8 and 
9, (1 — + 乙⑷ is non-(l — a ) & � - d e c r e a s i n g and non-
& � - i n c r e a s i n g on (g^+i, Therefore, gn,m is both iion-/<n，m⑴一 
decreasing and non-/<"„,’,„�-increasing on ( a ^ + i , � + 1 ) . Further more, it 
could be proved that gn,m.{h x is also q u a s i - � - c o n v e x on [a”.+i’ a；；^' 
and [ � + 1 ’ bn+i]' Therefore, there exist a'^  ^{i) 6 fln+i, f^n+i. 
I and b'{i) G 
bn+i, bn+i], such that gn,m.{h 工）is quasi-/Q’mW-convex with changeover 
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at a'n,rn{i�, and gn,m{h -工)is quasi-/<„_^.(z)-convex with changeover at 
The proof of (b) and (c) follows directly from Corollary 1 and Lemma 
7. 
(d) By (b), a state-dependent generalized (s, 5, H) policy is optimal. 
By Lemma 6 and without loss of generality, we suppose that the com-
pany sell the inventory to the markets {1, 2 , . . . , mi(z)} and order from 
{mi(z), mi(z) + 1 , . . . , mi(z) + 7712(2)}. Here we denote m � � = m i { i ) + 
爪2⑷，C„’1�> C n , 2 ( 0 � … > c „ ’ m i � � > . . . � 胸 ⑴ + 爪 ^ ⑴ ⑷ ， a n d 
the state-dependent thresholds and targets of this policy are 
�� S … “ � S HM.,{I){I) < • • • < H I ( I ) 
Si{i) < 82(1) < • < Sni,{i){i) < Sm.i{i)+i{i) < • • < 她 + 爪 . 2 � � . 
Thus, we have 
‘ - C ^ M X + KNAI) + GN�I{I, 5I(Z)), X > H,{L) 
-CnA^X + Kn、2[i) + G„’2(i，S^i)), 丑2(?:) < 3： < H,(i) 
( “ ) — < -CN,MI{I)(J')X + i ^ n ’ m i � � + G 寧 ! � ( i , � � ) ’ 丑 m i � � < ^ < i ^ m ] � 
-CN,M^IZ){I)X + KN,M,II){I) + <^N’MI(OFE 82(1) < X < S I { I ) 
-Cn，mo⑴+ Kn胸⑷(i) + Gn,moih <5^。⑷（?;))， 2； < Sm。⑴（2) 
x) + a PiiEfn+i{j, X — Dn), otherwise 
(4.7) 
By Assumption 2 and the derivation of these thresholds in Lemma 7, 
fn{i,oc) is continuous. Let an(i) = Si(z), b n { i ) = 丑 m i � � ’ thus > 
an{i). We divide the remaining work into three steps: 1. cx-\- is 
increasing on [ � � ’ + o o ) ; 2. cx + /„(z,a;) is decreasing on ( — o o , a „ � ] ; 
3. Both cx + fni'i.x) and cx + are non-Kn(z)-decreasing and 
non-^(z)-increasing on (an(?), bn{i))-
1. Since = • ^ m i ⑷ ⑷ ， i s piecewise linear and decreasing 
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when X > and none of the slopes are less than - c . Therefore, 
cx + fn(i, x) is increasing on the interval [bn{i), +00). 
2. Since � = S i ( z ) , x) is piecewise linear and decreasing when 
X < an{i), and none of the slopes are greater than —c. Therefore, 
cx + fn{i, x) is decreasing on the interval (—00，a„(z). 
3. We only need to prove that + /^(i, x) is 
decreasing and non-Kn,m (^-increasing on (a„(z), 6„(z)) for any m. 
Let ujn{i,x) := L{i,x) + a E j = i ^ ： — Dn)\in = i], rewrite 
as 
fn{i,工)=mi[Cn{i,z - x) . 
z>0 
Cn{i, z) is trading cost function that 
f 0, z = 0 
C N { H Z ) = 
I MMRJI{KN,M.(I) + CN,M{I)Z), Z 0 
When X e (a； (^仏 (?;)), si(z) < x < Hm,{i){i), thus the optimal deci-
sion is to do nothing. Then for any x,y e bn{i)) and y > x, 
= i n f [C.„.(i，z - x ) + LJnii, z) 
z>x 
< inf[C„(?:，2； — x)-\-uJn{i,z)' 
z>y 
< mi[Cn{i,z- y) + Cn{i,y - x) +ujn{i,z)' 
z>y 
= i n f [Cn(2, z-y)-\- a;„(?:，z)] + C„(z, y - x) 
z>y 
< fn{i, y) + + Cn,m(i)(y ~ x) 
Here the first inequality exists because the constraint on z > y limits 
the number of choice. The second inequality exists due to the charac-
ters of subaddtivite function by Theorem 1，and the last one due to the 
definition of trading cost function. Thus, for any m and any realiza-
tion and Cn,m.{i)x + is non-Kn,m(2)-decreasing 
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oil bn(i)). Similarly, for any x,y e ( a „ . � a n d y < x we 
have 
2>0 
< i n f Z - X ) + UJNII, Z)' 
o<z<y 
< inf [Cn{i, z-y) + CJ^i, ^J - x) + uj^i, z) 
0<z<y 
=inf [Cnii, z-y)+ a;„(z, z)] + y — x) 
0<z<y 
< fn{i, y) + Kn,rM + — 
Therefore, for any m, (：„’„,.�a: + fn(i, x) is non-/<n.,„^^-iiicreasing on 
{an{i),bn{i)) for any realization /(„’爪�’ and +/„(z , x) is non-
� - i n c r e a s i n g on ( a „ � 九⑷ ) . 
By now we have proved that fn(i, x) satisfies that 1. cx + fn[i,x) is 
increasing on � ’ +oo); 2. cx + x) is decreasing on (—oo, a„('i)]; 
3. Both cx + fn{i, x) and cx + /^(i, x) are non-Kn�-decreasing and 
non-Kn�-increasing on (a„(z), bn{i)). Thus x) G V*^^. • 
As indicated in the proof of Lemma 8, (z) is the maximal ordering 
threshold and bn{i) is the minimal selling threshold. Thus and 
bn{i) are dependent with the realization of unit price and setup cost, 
i.e., Cn,m{i) and Kn,mii)- As c„’』）and I<n,m{i) have boundaries, a , , . � 
and bn{i) are not infinite. Yet Assumption 8 and 9 have high restriction 
on C{x) and the boundaries of Cn^mii) and Kn,m(f). 
Theorem 3 If VT(-) G V^+i，Assumption 1-3 and 6-9 hold, then a 
state-dependent generalized (s, S, H) policy is optimal in any periods. 
Proof. It applies by induction. • 
By now we have characterized the optimal policy of this problem to 
find out which exchange market to trade at and how much to trade, 
and we illustrate the Optimality Cost Equation in Figure 4.4. 
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'‘ F N { I , X ) 
an’mWViy K,m{i) x 
Figure 4.4: Optimality Equation 
4.4 The Algorithm 
In this section, we give an algorithm to compute the thresholds and 
targets of the optimal (5, 5, H) policy and the optimal cost. 
For any fixed i, i e {1,2,...,/}，we first get Mi and M2 in Lemma 6 
by the method referred in its proof, and re-index the exchanges such 
that C I ( Z ) 〉 C 2 ( I ) � . . . � c 饥 i s in Mi, > C m , + 2 ( i ) � . . . � 
c 爪 i s in M2. 
• Step 0 (Initialization) Let set U{n,i) = 0, B{n,i) = 0. M[{n,i)= 
0 and M2(n, z) = 0. Let fN+i{h = 卿 ⑷ for any i e {1, 2 , . . . , /}. 
Set i = 1 and n = N. 
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• Step 1 For any m that 1 < m < mi, compute GVi’i(—(i,re), 
Sn,i{m){'i) and Hn,i{m){i)\ for any m that mi + 1 < m < mi + m:� 
compute Gn’i(7n)(i,工Sn,i(m)(i) aiid Sn,i(7n)(i) 
• Step 2.0 Set m 二 1 and Rj = {+oo}. 
• Step 2.1 For m < m' < rui and any i G {1,2,...’/}，compute 
H ⑷._ - Kn,m'{'i) + Gn,m{h Sn,m{i)) 一 Gn,m'{h Sn，m'(f)) 
’ ’ — CVi’m/� 
and compute 
H* 二 max[i/零(i) , min { H n „ ' { i ) ) ' . 
•’ m<m.'<m\ 
• Step 2.2 If > mill Ri, set m = m + 1; if H* ^ ) < mini?.i, 
then put into Ri, H* m{i)) into U{n,i) and m 
into M{(n, z), and set m = m + 1. 
• Step 2.3 If m < mi, go back to Step 2.1; if m > mi, compute 
x) with the threshold of ordering policy in U(n,i) and cor-
responding exchanges in M{(n,i) and go to Step 3.0. 
• Step 3.0 Set m = mi + m�and R2 = {-00}. 
• Step 3.1 For mi + 1 < m' < m and any i e { 1 , 2 , . . . , / } , compute 
S , � . = 7 < n ’ m � - K n , m / ( i ) + G^n.mfe >gn，m(?:)) - G^n.m'fe Sn’7n'(?:)) 
’ ’ CN’M(X) — Cn，7n,� 
and compute 
<’mOO 二 min[S„，,打(i), min (Sn,7n,m'(0)]-
mi + l<?n'<?n 
• Step 3.2 If s;.，爪⑷ < min set m = m + l; if > min 
then put into R2, (<,(i)，Sn,m{i)) into B{n,i) and m into 
M^(n’ z), and set m 二 m _ 1. 
• Step 3.3 If m > mi + 1, go back to Step 2.1; if m < m! + 1, 
compute fnih^) with the threshold of ordering policy in B{n,i) 
and corresponding exchanges in M!^{n,i�and go to Step 4. 
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• Step 3 Set i = i -h I. If i (mod I) is equal to 0, go to Step 4; if i 
(mod I) is greater than 0, go back to Step 1. 
• Step 4 Set n = n - 1. If n > 0, go back to Step 1; if n = 0, stop. 
With this algorithm, one can get the markets for sale in M((n, z), and 
the corresponding selling thresholds-targets in U(n, i), when the period 
state at period n is z,. One can also get the markets for purchase in 
M!^{n,i�, and the corresponding selling thresholds-targets in B(n, i). 
• E n d of c h a p t e r . 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
In this thesis we develop an inventory trading model for the compa-
nies that consume commodities such as natural gas, crude oil and their 
products. We consider a discrete-time, single-item, single-location in-
ventory system which can trade in different spot exchanges. And the 
prices of these exchanges are influenced by an exogenous Markov pro-
cess. The unique aspect of our model is the integration of a multi-source 
model and price dynamic model. We characterize the structure of our 
model's optimal inventory trading policy, which is determined by min-
imizing the expected cost, and find the conditions to ensure that the 
generalized (s, S, H) policy is optimal. We also give an algorithm to 
compute the thresholds and targets of this optimal policy. 
Our work can lend itself to the storable-commodity industries, which 
are characterized by spot-price fluctuation. For instance, one can use 
our model to optimize gas loading strategy for the gas fired generator. 
One can also apply the optimal inventory trading policy at the down-
stream storage facilities in the energy value chain, and assess these stor-
age facilities by quantifying the benefits generated from them. Further 
more, our model could be used to evaluate the leasing contracts on the 
downstream storage facilities. 
39 
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Finally, the value chain of energy commodities such as gas and oil al-
ways constitutes a seller and a buyer whose commercial relationships 
are governed by agreements and contracts. In our work we consider 
the benefit of the companies that consume the commodities based on 
exogenously specified price Markov process. Yet the study of contrac-
tual issues related to the interactions between sellers and buyers is a 
broader area for future research. 
• E n d of c h a p t e r . 
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